The war in Iran has taken an unexpected turn. The Iranians, despite a resounding military defeat, have managed not only to impose conditions on the U.S. but also to compel Israel to accept a ceasefire in Lebanon. The conflict there, which began with a blatant violation of the November 2024 ceasefire by its proxy, Hezbollah, has become the focal point of pressure on Jerusalem.
Yet the crisis runs deeper. After nearly three years of war, Israel finds itself stuck on three open fronts along its borders, and isolated on the international stage. Meanwhile Iran, which was on the brink of defeat, has emerged stronger and wealthier.
The most serious shift, however, is in Israel’s relations with the United States. Recent remarks by Vice President JD Vance suggest that the era of the "special relationship" between Jerusalem and Washington might be over. From being a "regional power" that "changes the face of the Middle East," in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s words, Israel has been reduced to a mere vassal, with its very right to self-defense now under discussion even in Washington.
This is no passing divergence. Future administrations in Washington are likely to be less committed to partnership with Israel than its predecessors, not more so. In the region, meanwhile, the very architecture of the Abraham Accords is now in question, since it was a product of the Iranian threat as well as Gulf assumptions that ties with Israel would bring with them American protective backing.
To adapt, Israel needs what I’ve called a “sustainable strategy,” and such an approach starts with a rethink of the country’s current approach to warfighting.
In both the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, the IDF has demonstrated impressive military capability grounded in superior airpower and the slow, methodical movement of ground forces. This approach has saved many soldiers' lives, but carries with it serious strategic drawbacks. A slower military pace permits the enemy to retreat and maintain itself as a military organization, and extends the length of the conflict.
To preserve its advances, Israel’s military must be prepared to both conquer and hold territory—something Israel’s citizen-based reserve army simply cannot sustain. And such sustained campaigns require enormous resources in the form of aerial munitions, heavy bulldozers, and interceptors; things that Israel lacks the industrial capacity toproduce, and is hard pressed to procure in needed quantities.
It was no accident that the security doctrine espoused in his day by David Ben-Gurion advocated for short, sharp wars focused on the military defeat of the immediate threat, and did not favor efforts to politically remake the larger region. Ben-Gurion recognized not just the strategic asymmetry arrayed against Israel in terms of economy, manpower, and regional political influence, but also the country’s existential dependence on a supportive global power.
Today, Israel is a technological power, not a defense-industrial one. Its advantage lies in software, smart components, and AI, not manufacturing. Its population has grown to about 10 million, yet it remains a negligible minority in the broader region. Israel can be a highly valuable partner to its neighbors, but it is not a political influencer.
Nevertheless, Israel has pioneered the integration of drones and AI into the battlefield. Following the Ukrainian example, it can now do more than just adopt all-out drone warfare. The country can also leverage the traditional strengths of its military and take this new era of automated warfare to the next level.
The IDF can and should set an example of how drone warfare can regain battlefield initiative and restore deep and rapid maneuverability, thus reclaiming Israel's characteristic dominance in short wars. Doing so will help not only with Israel’s own war strategy but also make it a more attractive and valuable ally.
Ben-Gurion’s principles, in other words, are still valid. Our means of warfare need to change, so as to extricate Israel from the trap of wars of attrition that weaken it politically, socially, economically, and militarily. Such a shift could also reduce dependence on imports and security assistance and reestablish the mutually beneficial nature of our alliance with the U.S. – a partnership based on cutting edge technology and strategic success.
Brigadier General (IDF, Res.) Eran Ortal is a visiting scholar at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.
