China’s rapidly advancing antiaccess/ area denial (A2/AD) capabilities are increasing the risk to U.S. and allied forces operating within the First Island Chain and increasingly out to the Second Island Chain and beyond. A key component of Beijing’s effort to modernize its military into a force capable of deterring and preventing U.S. military intervention during a conflict in its near abroad is the introduction of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that enhance the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to find, fix, and finish adversary forces across multiple domains. While the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) missile arsenal remains the backbone of China’s deterrence and counter-intervention strategy, the integration of next-generation UAS into the PLA force structure adds lowcost, mass-producible, attritable, and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare (EW), and strike options that complement manned assets and complicate U.S. and allied freedom of maneuver. By improving the PLA’s ability to maintain target custody, preserve sensor-toshooter connectivity in contested environments like the South China Sea, and provide low-cost strike options, the introduction of increasingly sophisticated UAS could make the PLA’s existing missiles, ships, and aircraft far more effective. For U.S. forces and policymakers, the integration of UAS into PLA force posture raises the potential costs of intervention in a conflict with China...