Over the past four years of war, the government of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv has been engaging in a delicate balancing act. Western aid – including from the United States – represents a vital lifeline that has enabled Ukraine to successfully battle back against Russian aggression. That support, however, has required careful alignment with Washington and other Western capitals on an array of issues. This, in turn, has meant Kyiv has had to wrestle with just how much it should cooperate with China.
The answer is more complicated than it appears, because China occupies a large presence in the Ukrainian economy. In 2019, it became Ukraine’s single biggest trading partner, with two-way trade of everything from machinery to foodstuffs valued in the neighborhood of $20 billion.
Beijing, moreover, has consistently sought a deeper stake in Ukraine’s economy. Even before the current war with Russia began, Chinese firms like Huawei had established a foothold in the country, and that footprint has persisted despite Western concerns. Chinese companies have also historically been active in Ukraine’s maritime sector, transportation, and much more. That engagement remains largely the same today, despite Beijing’s very public alignment with Moscow in world affairs.
What’s more, Chinese officials and state-connected companies have repeatedly signaled their desire to participate in Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction – an undertaking the World Bank estimates will cost on the order of $486 billion over the next decade. Given their extensive infrastructure experience in the Third World as a result of their government’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese firms no doubt represent an attractive option for Kyiv in this regard.
On the other hand, however, a closer partnership with China has invariably drawn concern and scrutiny in Washington – and added fuel to the arguments of critics, including many in President Trump’s political base, who have argued for a diminution or even an outright cessation of U.S. support.
Early on in the war, Kyiv still had hopes of keeping China a somewhat neutral party. But of late, it has increasingly gravitated to the understanding that the PRC has unequivocally picked sides. As a result, Ukraine is now beginning to decouple from China in at least one concrete arena: drone production.
The New York Times reports that Ukraine’s push for self-sufficiency in drone manufacturing – a critical part of its overall war effort – has prioritized the domestic production of key components such as circuit boards that had previously been sourced from suppliers like China. The result is an emerging capability to produce what Ukrainian officials describe as “China-free” drones – that is, systems built from domestically-produced components or sourced from trusted Western partners rather than PRC suppliers.
For Ukrainian planners, the logic is clear. They believe factors like the current “no limits” strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing, not to mention Ukraine’s current assistance to Persian Gulf nations in defending against another Chinese partner, Iran, might lead the PRC to cut off supplies of critical technology at some point. As such, they have come to see reliance on Chinese supply chains, and perhaps even Beijing more broadly, as a strategic vulnerability – one that they are increasingly eager to eliminate.
“Given the risks of sourcing components from China, which is unfriendly to us, the main task is to produce them in Ukraine,” Major Robert Brovdi, the head of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, tells the Times. “The strength of the Ukrainian manufacturer lies in the fact that import substitution has already taken place.”
For the moment, the capability to do so is still small in scale, given the ubiquitous nature of cheap Chinese-made components. Even so, Kyiv’s move toward “China-free” unmanned platforms is significant.
That’s because the Ukrainian government has come to see its formidable drone capabilities and rapid defense innovation cycle as distinct export commodities. Last month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced plans to open ten Ukraine-operated export centers throughout Europe devoted to defense technology by the end of this year. Some of those partnerships, like those with Germany and the United Kingdom, are already operational. Given this focus, officials in Kyiv have no doubt concluded that de-risking their drone industry will make it a more attractive destination for Western governments now increasingly apprehensive about the vulnerabilities associated with Chinese tech.
But Ukraine’s drone shift also represents an important political signal. It speaks volumes about who Ukraine thinks its strategic partners truly are, and where Kyiv ultimately believes its future lies.
About the Author: Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.