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Put
the Brakes on Iran's Nuclear Drive
By
Ilan Berman
published in Defense News
August 2, 2004
The widening international crisis over Iran’s nuclear program took another turn in late July, when Tehran was revealed to have restarted its development of advanced centrifuges in contravention of a deal recently struck with Britain, France and Germany.
Iran’s abrupt about-face, however, marks just the latest episode in what has become a long-running drama. Iranian nuclear ambitions have bedeviled the international community since late 2002, when an Iranian opposition group exposed the existence of an advanced uranium enrichment facility in the central Iranian town of Natanz. Since then, a series of discoveries by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and disclosures by the Iranians themselves, have uncovered a nuclear program of unprecedented scope.
Iran’s advances may have succeeded in generating a mounting chorus of international concern, most recently in the form of a June IAEA resolution blasting Tehran’s lack of nuclear transparency. But so far, they have fallen short of prompting any concrete action from the world community. And they have done nothing to address the true extent of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, or the growing strategic challenge now posed by the Islamic republic.
Iran is trying to acquire an offensive nuclear capability. Iran long has claimed that its nuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes. That story, however, rings hollow; with more than 10 percent of global oil and the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves, Iran is a virtual energy superpower with little need for additional energy sources.
Sure enough, Iran’s leaders recently placed the country’s nuclear program under the control of their powerful clerical army, the Pasdaran — a telltale sign of their true intentions. That fanatical group has long served as the regime’s enforcement arm, responsible for everything from the domestic persecution of dissidents to the orchestration of assassinations abroad.
And because the Pasdaran is the regime’s principal point of contact with groups like Hizbollah and Hamas, Iran’s nuclear advances now also carry with them a substantial danger of proliferation to terrorist groups.
Iran’s nuclear program is part of a larger strategy. In tandem with its nuclear progress, the Iranian regime has invested heavily in a broad national rearmament. The resulting military gains have already made Tehran capable of virtually controlling vital Arabian Gulf oil shipping lanes.
Now, against the backdrop of the U.S.-led war on terror, Iran’s leaders have stepped up their activism in the Arabian Gulf, Central Asia and Iraq. The goal, Iranian officials themselves admit, is to make their country the center of the post-Saddam Middle East.
International consensus is unlikely. In dealing with Tehran, European policy-makers have consistently gravitated to economic and diplomatic engagement, while American officials have preferred containment and isolation. These are more than simple style differences; they reflect fundamentally contrasting ways of coping with Iran’s rogue behavior.
None of this bodes well for prospects of an international consensus over Iran’s drive for nuclear status. Neither does the fact that two of Iran’s main atomic suppliers, Russia and China, wield veto power in the United Nations Security Council, making any serious international repercussions for Iran’s nuclear violations highly unlikely, at least in the near future.
Iran’s nuclear program is not the issue. Tehran’s atomic endeavor actually dates back to the early 1970s, when Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi launched a broad national effort to acquire nuclear power. That move raised few eyebrows in the West at the time, because Pahlavi, for all his failings, was viewed as a reasonably moderate and responsible ruler.
The same cannot be said about the current regime in Tehran. Consistent support for terrorism, ongoing efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and persistent dreams of regional dominance have made clear that Iran’s mullahs themselves, not just their nuclear aspirations, are the real problem.
For Washington, the consequences of inaction are enormous. Already, Iran’s successes have prompted weaker regional states to gravitate into its orbit. If armed with atomic weapons, Tehran’s potential for nuclear blackmail would cement its regional hegemony — much to the detriment of American interests.
A nuclear Iran also can be expected to spark an arms race among nervous states in the region. In fact, recent reports of Saudi-Pakistani nuclear contacts strongly suggest that at least one of Iran’s neighbors already has begun to actively contemplate the need for a strategic deterrent against the Islamic Republic.
Tehran’s progress so far has only been enabled by international indecision. The United States therefore must be prepared to take the lead in preventing it from going any further. At stake are nothing less than the geopolitical balance in the Middle East and the long-term success of U.S. strategy there.
Copyright 2004, Army Times Publishing Co.
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